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Health Care Insurance, Health Care, and  
the Impact of Disability
Health care insurance schemes, whether private or 
public, are notoriously unaccommodating to individu-
als with disabilities. While most nonelderly nondis-
abled persons in the U.S. are insured through private 
sources, coverage sources for nonelderly persons with 
disabilities have traditionally been a mix of private and 
public coverage.1 For all age groups, the employment-
to-population ratio is much lower for persons with a 
disability than for those with no disability. Moreover, 
employed persons with a disability were more likely 
to be self-employed than those with no disability.2 As 
a group, therefore, nonelderly people with disabilities 
have not been as well positioned as others to obtain 
private health care insurance because in the U.S., 
acquiring such coverage usually is employer based.
Private insurers have been wary of individuals with 
disabilities because, according to the U.S. Office of 
Disability, Aging and Long-Term Care Policy: “Health 
care expenditures are expected to be higher for the 
disabled than for the nondisabled, because of their 
higher utilization rates. However, the mean expense 
per event for all types of services available are also 
higher for the disabled than for the nondisabled.”3 
Both within and beyond the U.S., public health care 
insurance programs are designed to include at least 
some individuals with disabilities on their rolls.4 But 
rarely, if ever, has the bare inclusion of disabled people 
in such a public health care scheme been accompa-
nied by a mandate to be responsive to their disabilities 
in delineating the benefits to which participants are 
offered access.5 Some non-U.S. nations’ public health 
care rationing schemes have adopted prioritization 
systems that explicitly devalue some patients with dis-
abilities by presuming that their impairments depress 
their quality of life.6
 Once they are characterized as living less valuable 
lives than nondisabled people do, disabled individu-
als may readily be denied kinds and levels of care cus-
tomarily allocated without demurral to nondisabled 
people, often on the ground that they cannot be made 
functional, or kinds and levels of care ordinarily not 
needed by nondisabled people, often on the ground 
that it is too costly to make them functional.7
In the U.S., some public health care programs have 
balked at offering to disabled individuals the kinds of 
adaptive items they need to be restored to equitably 
functional daily life. To illustrate, the Medicare man-
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ual for power wheelchairs indicates that they are not a 
covered benefit unless they are medically necessary for 
use inside the home, thus confining people with signif-
icant mobility limitations to their homes just because 
they can maneuver within the residence without pow-
ered mobility assistance.8 Funding for non-mobility-
disabled individuals to repair mobility-damaging con-
ditions, such as surgery and casting for fractured hips 
and legs, and for some mobility-disabled individuals 
to compensate for mobility-damaging conditions, 
such as lower limb prostheses, do not carry the same 
restriction, which is imposed to lower costs by making 
wheelchair use as unpalatable as possible to those who 
can walk the few steps needed within a home. And 
U.S. private insurers often follow the public programs’ 
lead in determining the benefits they will provide.9 
The problems extend beyond insurance to health 
care offices and providers. A recent study indicated 
that a significant percentage of U.S. subspecialty 
physicians’ offices remain inaccessible, although the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) has required 
accessibility for almost 25 years.10 In the U.K., a 2007 
report called attention to mistreatment in the NHS of 
persons with learning disabilities. A report issued in 
2013 indicated that the situation had not changed and 
that between 2010 and 2012, 42% of the deaths in this 
group of patients were premature and attributable to 
poor health care and discriminatory attitudes within 
the NHS.11 
In this article, we explore whether an appropriate 
basis for effectively banning such differential treat-
ment as discrimination is an understanding — like 
that motivating the 2007 United Nations Conven-
tion on the Rights of People with Disabilities (CRPD) 
— that the highest attainable standard of health is a 
human right. Or is there an alternative understand-
ing of the basis for protecting disabled people against 
inequities in access to health care services that would 
prove preferable? 
When rights extend beyond protections from inter-
ference to the provision of goods such as health care 
or education, critics predictably invoke the specter 
of uncontrollable costs.12 Soon after the advent of 
U.S. Medicare, Charles Fried13 argued that the right 
to health care should be understood not as an equal 
right but as a right to a decent minimum because of 
its costs. In what follows, we begin by explaining why 
the understanding of health rights as human rights 
in the CRPD could be problematic for delineating a 
decent minimum that is equitable and inclusive for 
people with disabilities. We then develop an alterna-
tive, non-metaphysical account of rights construed 
not as human rights but as civil rights instantiated in 
ongoing social agreements. We conclude by applying 
this account to the right to health care under the U.S. 
Affordable Care Act (ACA).
Health Care under the Convention on the 
Rights of People with Disabilities 
Coming into force in 2008, the CRPD is a human 
rights instrument meant to delineate universal free-
doms and protections that all disabled people deserve. 
States parties to the CRPD commit to ensure that per-
sons with disabilities are afforded full equality, includ-
ing equal protection under the law. To date, 130 of the 
155 signatory nations have ratified the CRPD; the U.S. 
is a signatory, but the Senate has yet to give the con-
sent required for ratification.
Article 25 of the CRPD recognizes persons with dis-
abilities as possessing a “right to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of health without discrim-
ination on the basis of disability.” Discrimination on 
the basis of disability in the provision of health insur-
ance is prohibited. Further, health insurance must be 
made available to the disabled in a fair and reasonable 
manner. States parties are to prevent discriminatory 
denial of health care or health services or food and flu-
ids on the basis of disability. Disabled people are to 
be provided with the same range, quality, and stan-
We explore whether an appropriate basis for effectively  
banning such differential treatment as discrimination is an understanding 
— like that motivating the 2007 United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of People with Disabilities — that the highest attainable standard of health 
is a human right. Or is there an alternative understanding of the basis for 
protecting disabled people against inequities in access to health care services 
that would prove preferable? 
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dard of free or affordable health care and programs 
as provided to other persons, but also with health ser-
vices they need specifically because of their disabili-
ties. This latter provision entails that, due to disability, 
utilization of basic packages of essential services may 
be larger for some individuals than for others. It also 
entails that basic packages must be constructed so as 
not to exclude services essential for people with dis-
abilities such as lower extremity prostheses or phar-
maceuticals needed by patients with cystic fibrosis 
or multiple sclerosis. Health care professionals are to 
provide care of the same quality to persons with dis-
abilities as to others; further, to apply health care ser-
vices equitably to people with disabilities calls for their 
free and informed consent. 
Such equitable practice is to be accomplished 
explicitly by raising awareness of the human rights, 
dignity, autonomy, and needs of persons with dis-
abilities through training and the promulgation of 
ethical standards for public and private health care. 
As with some of the other components of the CRPD, 
the conceptualization of human rights here mixes 
civil rights and social rights within a framework that 
accords these rights to all humans just on the basis of 
their being human.14 Thus, the CRPD pioneers aimed 
to bring the aspirations of people with disabilities for 
equality fully within the post-World War II movement 
to expand global recognition of human rights. The 
conceptual task is challenging, as the objective is to 
defend differential distributive treatment as equitable 
using ground that traditionally has rooted human 
rights in the presumption that persons essentially 
must be the same because all humans are persons and 
only humans are persons.
Human Exceptionalism as a Basis for 
Equitable Access to Health Care 
The human rights frame initiated in European politi-
cal discourse in the 16th century became fully endowed 
with philosophical justifications during the 17th and 
18th centuries and thereafter has inspired a multi-
tude of emancipatory enterprises and movements.15 
In contrast to earlier accounts of the protections and 
privileges due humans from the state, which sorted 
humans into different classes and ranked the groups 
as to comparative worth, the traditional human rights 
position is that all humans equally are owed freedom 
from political or state-facilitated oppression.16 For the 
human rights tradition, or at least for its older branch, 
each human’s obligation to respect and protect other 
humans derives from our all sharing the essential 
properties of human nature.17 Human rights are uni-
versal rights, belonging to everyone in virtue of their 
being human.18
This “human exceptionalism” approach argues that 
humans are distinguished from other animals in some 
singular objective way.19 Each human has a claim on 
recognition and respect from others because all alike 
seek opportunity to realize their uniquely human value 
in social interaction.20 But human exceptionalism 
notoriously grants, as a corollary, permission to forgo 
acknowledging individuals who do not seem to mani-
fest the essential human characteristic as bearers of 
rights. Thus, rights claims pertaining to biological indi-
viduals who might resemble humans in some — indeed, 
in many or even most — respects are open to being 
dismissed on ontological grounds by reference to their 
lacking a crucial human-making property.21 So might 
robots, however human their appearance and conduct, 
be denied rights; since Isaac Asimov’s I, Robot,22 the 
matter of whether machines and animals have human 
liberty rights has been a central post-WWII science fic-
tion theme.23 And so have individuals with disabilities 
been denied the status of rights bearers. 
Two different components of human nature have 
been invoked as the proper basis for acknowledging 
human rights. One kind of property is a broadly con-
strued psychological or mental property. The other is 
a broadly construed biological or material property.24
The argument for human rights based on distinc-
tively human mental properties usually unfolds thus: 
a crucial cognitive or other kind of mental capac-
ity is asserted to differentiate humans from other 
species. For example, Michael Tooley25 argued that 
“[a]n organism possesses a serious right to life only 
if it possesses the concept of a self as a continuing 
subject of experiences and other mental states, and 
believes that it is itself such a continuing entity.” A 
further step equates distinctively human psychologi-
cal capacity with the capacity for rational conduct, and 
especially for formulating aims for action through self-
reflection.26 This singular characteristic that makes 
humans unique also is supposed to be the source of 
our fundamental value to ourselves and to each other. 
Each human therefore should respect the capacity of 
adult humans to execute the requisite kind of rational 
action, and to accept self-reflective responsibility for 
what has been done. But exercising our exceptional 
capacities requires being sufficiently self-governing, 
and free from social and political subordination, to 
self-determine the good for one’s self.27 
Thus, from a mental difference that purportedly 
makes humans exceptional has been drawn a warrant 
for acknowledging and attributing human rights. Plac-
ing human rights on this basis, however, precludes the 
possibility that human rights can be universal in the 
requisite sense. Disabled people commonly have been 
perceived as failing to meet the standard of capacity 
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for self-reflective (and thereby responsible) action.28 
Consequently, individuals who are biologically human 
but are perceived as lacking the crucial level of cog-
nitive capacity have been denied the usual freedom, 
and moral and legal protections, that human rights 
are expected to bestow. The metaphysical move of 
grounding rights in essential human properties thus 
has enabled exclusion from, rather than inclusion 
under, rights-bearers’ protection. 
There is, further, an infamous history of underes-
timating the capacities of individuals, based on their 
disabilities. For centuries, hearing-impaired people 
were mistakenly assessed as intellectually impaired, 
just because they did not speak what they thought.29 
The centuries of denying schooling to intellectually 
disabled people, as well as to people with other kinds 
of disabilities, and then condemning them as unable 
to learn because they lacked reading and writing 
skills other people acquired through schooling, also 
illustrate the effect of bias on accurate assessment of 
disabled people’s capacity.30 In general, non-verbal 
individuals, and other individuals whose disabilities 
impede communication, remain vulnerable to mis-
judgment of this kind. The impact of such bias against 
failing to display the species-definitive mental capac-
ity set as the standard for being human is that biologi-
cally human individuals with disabilities have been 
regarded as not being really human or fully human 
persons with the same entitlements as other people. 
This pretext has regularly motivated excluding 
disabled people from the ranks of rights bearers. As 
a result, in many legal systems individuals with dis-
abilities have been bereft of legal standing and thereby 
deprived of equal protection from the law. Article 12 of 
the CRPD attempts a remedy, adjuring states parties 
to reaffirm the right of people with disabilities to be 
recognized as full persons and to enjoy legal capacity 
on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life. But 
the components of Article 12 that direct states parties 
to provide for effective safeguards to prevent abuse, 
coercion, exploitation, and arbitrary or excessive con-
finement, and of Article 13 that call for ensuring effec-
tive access to justice for persons with disabilities on an 
equal basis with others, indicate the enormous amount 
of justice system reform through which nations must 
go to achieve justice for all, including disabled people. 
Human rights are supposed to be universal, but the 
adduced essential human-making properties are not 
co-extensive with the class of individuals who in other 
circumstances are taken to be humans. Contrary to 
human rights programs’ mandate to promote equal-
ity, this strategy does not escape sorting individuals, 
based on non-disability or disability, into classes of 
higher and lower status, with the former more socially 
privileged and better protected than the latter. That 
affirmation of full legal standing to invoke rights has 
been so hard for disabled people to attain suggests the 
hazards of invoking a species-definitive psychological 
or mental capacity in validating human rights.
If special intellectual capacity is not the hallmark, 
perhaps the universality of human rights lies in the 
other familiar articulation of human exceptionalism, 
which is the claim that humans are all equally prod-
ucts of a special and singularly successful biological 
evolutionary process.31 The idea here is that humans 
are naturally constructed to be concerned about our-
selves, and for those we believe to be our close bio-
logical kin as well. We biologically bond with kin to 
care for our offspring, and we naturally also ally with 
the smaller and larger circles of humans on whom our 
own welfare and our family’s welfare depend. 
Biological exceptionalism also lends itself to privi-
leging some humans and marginalizing or excluding 
others. If kinship is supposed to be the basis of each 
human’s duty to acknowledge human rights of others, 
some individuals will enjoy a more secure status than 
others, depending on how broadly their family resem-
blances reach. Far from being an expansive basis for 
human rights, biological exceptionalism seems to 
energize a kind of tribalism that might embrace close 
family members who happen to have disabilities, but 
by no means extends to most disabled people, who 
remain anonymous anomalous individuals distanced 
and treated as alien because of their disabilities. 
Another reason for concern about the power of inclu-
siveness offered by a “family ties” basis for universal 
human rights emerges from the muted or absent fam-
ily responses to the disappearance of their disabled 
relatives during the Nazi euthanasia program years.32 
Sourcing a health care right in individuals’ human-
ity, when this status is assigned on the basis of kin-
ship bonds, also threatens to strain the health care 
system. In this circumstance, the most pressing and 
effectively presented claims for care will come from 
family advocates for whom the patient is supremely 
human and thereby deserving of the full array of care 
that medicine can offer. The troubled and sometimes 
ruinous process whereby families of disabled children 
are expected to advocate extensively so as to obtain 
special educational services should serve as a warn-
ing here. Better-educated families in more favorable 
economic condition have proven more successful than 
less fortunate ones in obtaining services, and individ-
uals with disabilities bereft of favorable family support 
may have no one advocating for them at all.33 
Disparities of social status, which track appear-
ance of functional deficit but do not take into account 
the adaptive functionality achievable with access to 
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effective services, can create unnecessary problems in 
assembling an essential health care benefits package. 
Bias that promotes normal appearance or conduct, or 
family resemblance, as important for preferable status 
and privilege, while anomalous function or presence 
has the opposite result, places a premium on provid-
ing medical procedures that aim at normality rather 
than adaptive functionality. Individuals are best situ-
ated to claim such rights when their appearances 
and conduct most resemble the species’ paradigm, or 
else they look and act as their family or community 
group expects, but rights with warrants contingent on 
such family ties fall short of the universality to which 
human rights aspire.34 
Although some human rights theorists believe this 
human exceptionalist basis of rights affords dignity and 
therefore rights-bearer status without being defeasible 
due to disability,35 there are both historical and logi-
cal reasons for being skeptical of this claim. To invoke 
uniquely human properties as the basis of human rights 
is to place a premium on the disabled’s similarity or fam-
ily resemblance to species-typical or normal humans. 
In the circumstances created by grounding policy in 
human exceptionalism, therefore, equitable essen-
tial health care packages ought to cover interventions 
meant to make patients seem more normal, whether or 
not they make the individual more functional. 
In such circumstances, we should expect a human 
right to health care to be invoked in demands for 
health care interventions aimed at enabling the patient 
to appear less unusual or to seem normal. Health care 
packages thus would need to be designed with nor-
mality as the touchstone. Likely results could be, on 
the one hand, reluctance to cover services needed to 
attain functionality if supposed normality cannot be 
fully achieved, but, on the other hand, consumption of 
resources and courting of risks just to gain the appear-
ance of or to approximate normality, even if reduced 
functionality results from such medical treatment.36 
So this recipe, called for by the standard for being 
treated as human that exceptionalism sets, appears to 
drive misguided, but also unnecessarily costly, health 
care interventions. 
Collective Agreement as a Basis for 
Equitable Access to Health Care
To summarize so far, human exceptionalism is a tra-
ditional, and perhaps the prevailing, approach to 
grounding human rights, one with roots that predate 
the Enlightenment and one that remains strong today. 
But theories about an exceptional human psychologi-
cal capacity for logical or reflective thinking, or an 
exceptional human biological capacity for personal 
attachment, both turn too easily into rationales for 
excluding at least some disabled humans from human 
rights protection by portraying them as so lacking in 
crucial, and exclusively human, dignity-conferring 
properties that they fail to qualify as rights-bearers.37 
And in regard to individuals whose disabilities do not 
debar them from the usual ontology of the human 
species or humankind, a traditional human rights 
approach lacks theoretical resources to respond to 
those who are concerned that rights will become costly 
demands for services that are less about functionality 
than about the appearance of normality.
An alternative approach to rights rejects metaphysi-
cal beliefs about essential humanizing properties and 
instead understands rights as tools that both emerge 
from and enable the kinds of human interactions that 
shape our social environment. We humans are, indi-
vidually as well as collectively, both creators of our own 
political and cultural values yet also creatures of the 
liberating or constricting political and cultural con-
ditions we create. It follows that we humans possess 
individual and collective powers to narrow or expand 
who can be considered the parties included in such 
tacit cooperative agreements, as well as to regulate 
the repertoire of roles made available to facilitate dif-
ferent people’s inclusion. As Rousseau observed, our 
frailty is a main characteristic that we humans have in 
common.38 What approach to avoiding disability bias 
in delineation of essential health care benefits might 
be developed by invoking such non-metaphysical 
grounds for rights?
Justice is constructed through building trust relationships that are inclusive 
of outliers. Thus, justice should be understood always as a work in progress.
We should not suppose, despite ideal justice theorizing pressing  
us to do so, that fully inclusive and therefore universal justice can  
be a fait accompli. Rights claims are no exceptions.
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Tacit Agreement and Rights as Civil Rights 
On a pragmatist view, what political morality requires 
is evolving and context-dependent. Humans live and 
interact in communities, developing, shaping, test-
ing, and reshaping norms by which to live together. As 
Ruth Anna Putnam39 points out, “Unlike other social 
animals, we are able to reflect on the ways in which we 
cooperate and on the effects of the manner of our asso-
ciation on ourselves and others.” As we have argued,40 
justice is constructed through building trust relation-
ships that are inclusive of outliers. Thus, as we also 
have argued, justice should be understood always as 
a work in progress.41 We should not suppose, despite 
ideal justice theorizing pressing us to do so, that fully 
inclusive and therefore universal justice can be a fait 
accompli. 
Rights claims are no exceptions. Political rights are 
the original core of the civil rights and international 
rights movements.42 Made within political institu-
tions, both national and international,43 their function 
is to press political institutions to recognize what is 
necessary for each of their members to lead flourish-
ing lives within them, hence their acknowledgement 
of universal aspiration. Understood pragmatically, 
rights are instruments for expanding equality among 
different kinds of individuals who happen to be 
interacting with one another. Thus, their expression 
resists schemes that appoint some individuals as more 
deserving of flourishing than others. This expansive 
drive emerges from the nature of such rights, which 
is to protect individuals’ interactions by promoting 
respect equally for the integrity of all who have occa-
sion to engage. As such, rights claims both reflect and 
challenge social arrangements. They both accept and 
question resource constraints, building on what exists 
in the continuing effort to create conditions under 
which all flourish because each can flourish. From a 
practical political organizing perspective, calls for civil 
rights engagement are familiar inspiration for such 
progressive pragmatic efforts. 
Within this context, rights are claims on the social 
resources needed to meet basic interests that are criti-
cal to individuals’ interactive flourishing. For what 
have been termed “negative” rights — i.e., rights to 
non-interference — these are the institutions that 
protect physical security, freedom from torture and 
slavery, liberty of thought and expression, privacy, 
freedom of movement, and the like.44 They are the 
political rights of assembly and participation.45 For 
what have been termed “positive” rights — i.e., rights 
to specified resources — these are means by which to 
meet critical human needs: food, shelter, health care, 
education, employment, and the like.46 
Our contention here is that these rights should be 
understood in a pragmatist rather than a metaphysi-
cal framework, grounded explicitly in acknowledge-
ment of people’s differences rather than rooted in 
claims about how humans essentially are the same. 
How rights are instantiated specifically in a given 
social context depends on the normative understand-
ings in place at that time. These tacit understandings 
are not static, however; they are continually pressed to 
develop possibilities of flourishing for all. 
Rights to health care can be understood purely 
as civil rights in this way. Existing assumptions and 
resources are the start. But their inclusiveness is sub-
ject to ongoing challenge in terms of whether they 
allow everyone equally to lead flourishing lives in 
accord with their conceptions of their good.47 This 
may cost more for some than for others; the point 
is that each should have meaningful access to the 
benefits that health care can provide to them in the 
context in which they live. In what follows, we apply 
this approach — existing assumptions and resources 
tested against a meaningful access standard to health 
care in a manner that respects all — to the ACA and 
the cost pressures on it. Similar points could be made 
about cost pressures on the public health systems in 
place in most other advanced industrial countries. 
ACA: Existing Assumptions
The ACA of 2010 was developed in a context in which 
approximately 45 million lawful U.S. residents were 
estimated to lack health insurance and many more 
had coverage inadequate to their needs. Those with 
insurance derived their coverage primarily from their 
employers, from the Medicaid federal-state partner-
ship that provides coverage for the poor falling into 
designated categories, and from the Medicare pro-
gram for the elderly and those with long-lasting dis-
abilities. All of these programs were undergoing seri-
ous financial strain. Employer-provided insurance 
was contracting in the numbers of employers offering 
coverage, in the coverage provided, and in the extent 
to which costs were passed on to persons with insur-
ance. The ACA aimed both to expand coverage and to 
stem the tidal wave of coverage reductions.
The ACA also sought to move beyond limitations in 
anti-discrimination. In the private market, the ADA 
Title I provided the only bulwark against disability 
discrimination in employer-provided insurance. Title 
I permits employer-provided plans to design benefits 
or charge rates based on underwriting judgments that 
are consistent with state law, so long as these are not 
a subterfuge for discrimination48 — thus permitting 
significant differences in coverage and costs based on 
types of health needs. For plans purchased by individ-
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uals on their own, ADA Title III, the public accom-
modations title, provided protection in accessing the 
offices in which insurance is sold but not the products 
available therein.49 The ACA sets out to remedy these 
deficiencies in several ways. Large employers (with 
over 50 employees) must offer affordable coverage of a 
core set of benefits or pay penalties. Smaller employers 
and employees who do not have access to employer-
provided coverage are to be able to purchase coverage 
through exchanges created in each state; plans sold 
through the exchanges must cover essential benefits. 
Other anti-discrimination protections applied 
to public services, including Medicare and Medic-
aid. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provided that 
“[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability 
in the United States…shall, solely by reason of her or 
his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimina-
tion under any program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance or under any program or activity 
conducted by any Executive agency or by the United 
States Postal Service.”50 Subsequently, ADA Title II, 
the public services title, adopted the same language 
to cover public services,51 and the two statutes have 
been interpreted in tandem. In a critical 1985 decision 
under the Rehabilitation Act, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that it is a denial of benefits to fail to provide 
individuals with meaningful access to the benefits in 
question.52 
Alexander v. Choate involved Tennessee’s decision 
to limit Medicaid’s inpatient hospital benefit to 14 
days in any given year. Although it has been viewed 
as implying that financially motivated state Medicaid 
cutbacks are within the discretion of states and are not 
disability discrimination, this is not what the decision 
actually holds.53 In the decision, the Court adopted 
the standard that persons with disabilities must have 
meaningful access to federally funded programs or 
to public services. However, the Court also held that 
the plaintiffs had not shown that Tennessee failed to 
meet this standard. Although the plaintiffs had shown 
that some patients had been discharged earlier than 
their physicians recommended or had not been able 
to receive certain types of care within the limit, they 
had not shown that these limits functioned to deny 
meaningful access to health care persons with dis-
abilities in particular. The meaningful access standard 
has been used in a wide variety of subsequent deci-
sions involving public services other than health care 
— but the misinterpretation that Alexander v. Choate 
gives states wide discretion in cutting health benefits 
remains. With this backdrop, limited effort has been 
devoted to developing an understanding of meaning-
ful access to health care for people with disabilities, 
along with everyone else.
The ACA was aimed to stem the receding tide 
of private health insurance by providing access for 
individuals and small businesses to affordable cover-
age of essential benefits. It also was meant to expand 
coverage of public programs to everyone below 138% 
of poverty. The objective was to provide a minimum 
national floor of health care for everyone. What this 
means in regard to providing disabled people with the 
opportunity to obtain equitable health care will need 
to be informed by a conceptualization of meaningful 
access on equal terms for all.
ACA as a Civil Right: Meaningful Access  
on Equal Terms for All 
The ACA has been promoted to disabled people as a 
cure for the disadvantage they typically have had to 
endure in both seeking and utilizing health care cov-
erage. Healthcare.gov,54 a federal website managed by 
the Department of Health and Human Services, tells 
disabled people: 
If you’re living with a disability, private health 
insurance may be hard to come by. Even if you 
can afford to buy it, it probably doesn’t cover 
all of your needs. Worrying about where to get 
coverage and the cost of your care is the last 
thing you want to do. The Affordable Care Act is 
expanding your options for health insurance and 
making them more affordable. 
Much of the website’s text describing options, how-
ever, focuses on elimination of pre-existing condition 
requirements, provision of preventive care to avoid 
disabling conditions (presumably to reduce the size of 
the group the message needs to reach), and proscrip-
tion in some cases of a cap on lifetime benefits. Absent 
is reassurance of what actual benefits may be, other 
than abstract reference to mandating an essential 
benefits package covering a very generally specified 
collection of services. 
Moreover, dire predictions about cost pressures 
sound a continuing drumbeat. There seems to be 
general agreement that health care costs have to be 
brought down, but also that more people must be 
served. In this regard, it will be attractive to suppose 
that the least costly approach is to tailor services to 
the needs of typical patients, even though doing so 
may make health care more expensive or unavailable 
for atypical ones. Such thinking cannot help but invite 
imposing disparately disadvantageous burdens of cost 
for health care and access to health care on individu-
als with disabilities. For these reasons, whether the 
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ACA improves health for disabled people by improv-
ing their access to health care will to a great extent be 
decided by how essential benefits are defined. 
In principle, the ACA alters the U.S. health care 
picture by opening the opportunity to be insured for 
health care to everyone alike. In doing so, however, 
the ACA also opens questions about how to avoid 
disability-based discrimination in providing for the 
potential health services needs of individuals who 
vary dramatically in their health states, and especially 
of individuals who may incur higher expenses for one 
or more reasons relating to their disabilities. We high-
light several areas of particular concern here, showing 
how the understanding of rights as civil rights applies 
to them: defining essential benefits for coverage sold 
through exchanges, making possible changes in the 
Medicaid program, and permitting plans to charge 
more for individuals who do not meet specified well-
ness targets.
The services that constitute essential health bene-
fits for insurance plans offered through exchanges fall 
into ten categories. Some of these — such as mental 
health services, rehabilitative and habilitative services 
and devices, and chronic disease management — are 
of special importance to people with disabilities. The 
degree to which each disabled person in the U.S. can 
be functional and independent will be affected by how 
austere, or generous, the minimal provision of services 
in these categories will have to be. The character of the 
minimum will constrain not only those disabled peo-
ple who have the barest permissible coverage for such 
services, but also more affluent disabled individuals 
who can afford to purchase higher end coverage and 
to make supplementary non-reimbursed purchases of 
equipment and treatments as well. 
For example, the quality of rehabilitation services 
and assistive equipment that is available for purchase 
is constrained by what insurance will pay, even for 
private purchasers, because insurance programs con-
stitute the largest market. What is covered by “reha-
bilitative and habilitative” services may make an enor-
mous difference in regard to access by people with 
disabilities. If rehabilitative services do not include 
services needed to maintain function, but only include 
services that increase function — as is the case for 
many plans, including Medicare, today, patients with 
incurable disabling conditions may find their access 
to the repertoire of physical, psychological, and occu-
pational therapeutic services to be greatly inferior to 
that of patients for whom normal functioning can be 
restored. Further, for other services, such as hospital-
ization and maternity services, disabled people often 
may need more extensive or different services than 
nondisabled people typically do. Emphasizing the 
expense of services — e.g., the U.S. decision to impose 
a tax on so-called “Cadillac” high premium plans— 
puts the question exactly backwards by construal in 
terms of what can be fitted within cost constraints.55 
Indeed, one recent analysis indicates that taxing based 
on premium costs, rather than examining how varia-
tions in such matters as salaries or regional differences 
in utilization affect plan costs, risks reducing needed 
services.56 Rather, the question should be what is 
required for functioning on equal terms and how this 
can best be achieved.
The original idea of ACA was that the essential 
benefits required of plans sold through exchanges 
would be uniform nationally. That way, people would 
not find themselves consigned to limits by the arbi-
trary accident of geography. However, beyond the 
categories required in the statute, the idea of uni-
form essential benefits has proved difficult to apply. 
Instead, benchmark plans have been selected for each 
state, reflecting the type of coverage available in that 
location. The result is considerable flexibility in what 
essential benefits might require, especially for items 
such as durable medical equipment or home health 
care that may be especially important to people with 
disabilities.57 If available plans fall short in providing 
meaningful access to groups of people such as those 
with mobility impairments, however, they will be sub-
ject to challenge under the civil rights view we have 
developed above. 
Other risks are persistent limits in Medicaid, the 
U.S. safety net program providing health insurance 
for eligible categories of people in poverty. U.S. states 
are not required to have Medicaid; before the ACA, all 
states participated in the program but many offered 
only the minimum requirements for pregnant women, 
children, the elderly, people in certain categories of 
disability, and others who were made eligible by fall-
ing into specified categories. Excluded were many 
adults, including people with disabilities not falling 
into the specified categories or over the maximum 
limits on income and assets but unable to purchase 
insurance through the private market. A goal of the 
ACA was expanding Medicaid to cover these people at 
least up to those with incomes of 138% of poverty. The 
U.S. Supreme Court, however, determined that this 
required expansion trammeled on the role of states 
in the federalist system. Many states are balking at 
expanding Medicaid coverage, thus leaving people in 
those groups still without likely access to health insur-
ance. Moreover, a few states are trying to bargain with 
the federal government to let them use Medicaid pro-
gram money to buy exchange coverage; states such as 
Ohio and Florida have sought additional concessions 
that they will not need to cover services included in 
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Medicaid if the services are not included in the state 
benchmark plan. The federal government has resisted 
these bargaining efforts, making it likely that these 
states will join the states not expanding Medicaid. In 
all of these states, many individuals in poverty or near-
poverty, some with disabilities, will not have access to 
health care at all except on a charity or emergency 
basis, thus perforce, not having meaningful access to 
these benefits. Even those with Medicaid may not have 
meaningful access to health benefits on the terms of 
others in society, given likely cutbacks imposed to save 
money. For example, Louisiana has announced cuts 
in hospice services and psychiatric care for Medicaid 
patients.58 
Also of concern are premium variations for per-
sons not meeting specified wellness targets. Coverage 
sold through exchanges must not exclude pre-existing 
conditions and premiums must be community rated. 
However, there may be significant variations in pre-
miums for failure to reach wellness targets. There are 
exceptions for people whose physicians certify they 
cannot meet targets or meeting the target would not 
be medically advised. 
How this permission to increase premiums for indi-
viduals who fail to meet targets will be applied to peo-
ple with disabilities is unclear.59 The ACA prohibits 
discrimination based on health status.60 However, the 
ACA also makes it clear that the premium difference 
is not discrimination based on health status. It is not 
unheard of to place responsibility for having physical 
or mental deficits, or for failing to overcome these, on 
the disabled. It may be difficult to prevent insurance 
companies, whose interests lie with deflecting respon-
sibility onto the insured, from delineating as strait-
ened a space as law and public sentiment will allow 
for unavoidable absence of wellness. 
The prospect here is for a replay of the avalanche, 
encountered during the first two decades of the ADA, 
of successful defenses against charges of disability 
discrimination based on narrowing the definition 
of disability. Even though Congress subsequently 
amended the ADA to block excessive constriction 
of the disability category and thus signaled intent 
to provide protection against disability-based dis-
crimination in a fairly broad way, there is little indi-
cation of how this approach would play out in the 
complex context of disparate impact of disability on 
health insurance premiums. Especially difficult will 
be determination of whether different treatment was 
on the basis of disability or for other non-discrimi-
natory reasons. Therefore, it will be critical to pro-
vide that exceptions for those whose disabilities pre-
vent them from participating in standard wellness 
programs be readily available without reproducing 
the familiar adversarial processes required by other 
programs for persons to prove disability. Otherwise, 
on this basis as well, implementation of the ACA will 
violate the civil right to health care as understood in 
this discussion. 
Conclusion
The promise of health care as a right has all too often 
proved hollow for people with disabilities. In this arti-
cle, we have argued that the understanding of health 
care as a human right, as found in the CRPD, fails to 
provide the theoretical machinery for responding to 
the pressing challenges of health care costs. These 
challenges are real and potentially devastating. We 
develop instead an account of health care as a civil 
right. What this right requires is dependent on the 
context and resources of the time, so long as all have 
meaningful access to the benefits provided. The ACA 
includes some provisions that may prove antithetical 
to this nondiscrimination standard. 
In the circumstances created by grounding policy in 
human exceptionalism, the conclusion to be drawn is 
that equitable essential health care packages ought to 
cover interventions meant to make individuals seem 
more normal, whether or not they make the patient 
more functional. To invoke uniquely human properties 
as the basis of human rights is to place a premium on 
the disabled’s similarity to species-typical or normal 
humans. Instead, the driving rights-based challenge 
to existing arrangements with respect to health care 
We have argued that the understanding of health care as a human right, as 
found in the CRPD, fails to provide the theoretical machinery for responding 
to the pressing challenges of health care costs. These challenges are real and 
potentially devastating. We develop instead an account of health care as a civil 
right. What this right requires is dependent on the context and resources of 
the time, so long as all have meaningful access to the benefits provided. 
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should be the extent to which these arrangements pro-
vide each on equal terms with the health care needed 
to lead flourishing lives. 
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